Explaining Processes of Beliefs as Plato's Forms

This paper presents an argument that distinguishes a person as an attributor from the subject of knowledge. The purpose is to explain how a priori concepts exist because of reasons, rather than causes, which say how time is contingent on ideas. The ways that the mind describes the actions of the body is part of a teleological account of the world, which relates cognition with certainty. Since there are words that change from contexts, logic must show why ideas change because of signification. If there are sufficient ways to justify the modality of rational thinking, Plato's forms succeed as metaphysical items that are part of the category, substance. Since there are various configurations of objects, the functions of forms are to unite reality with belief and provide a source for a first order logic with identity. The forms become the traits of reality that have certain truths through the teleology of ideas. This gives rise to a rational nature of thought that makes representations about the world based on logic and observation. The grounds of validity of logic must show the processes that accept what propositions have relevant alternatives according to their future possibilities. Thus, the reconstruction of Hume's problem of induction aims to say why unobserved events have different natures than observed consequences. If there can be a category that demonstrates what the forms will do in the future, there are certain ways to define what they are in the present. This means that an argument concerning the nature of the forms is required to explain why their descriptions can vary the validity of their assertions. The practical way of understanding must unite with the teleological view of the person.