Abstract
A new theory addressing orthodoxy issues:
- If 'liberty' is self- evident, why no consensus?
- How to reconcile 'liberty’ as autonomy, with communal?
- How to reconcile liberty with 'tolerance', 'paternalism' and 'social welfare'? Is 'liberty' not self-refuting?
- In liberal societies, why is liberty for many an aspiration not social reality?
- Why do rules designed to promote liberty often fail, even when generally adhered to?
Elements of ‘liberty as communal freedom’:
- Liberty is not perfect autarchy or autonomy, but autarchic action through integral individuality, understood communally.
- Liberty is 'communal freedom'’, the primary suprametavlue.
- 'Freedom through communal living' involves deference and tolerance. 'Liberty' is freedom through tolerance.
- Rejecting 'rights-primitive' individuality negates ‘paternalism’.
- Welfare needs are part of liberty.
- Liberty cannot be at the expense of others.
- 'Good' political arrangements are nonpersonal and anti- situational, whereas liberty is character regarding and situational.



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