objects are (not) ...

... try to explore, what properties objects are presupposed to have, in order to enter the universe of discourse of an interpreted formalized language. First I review Frege′s analysis of the logical structure of truth value definite sentences of scientific colloquial language, to draw suggestions from his saturated vs. unsaturated sentence components paradigm. Next try investigate, in how far reference to non pure math objects might allow for a role as argument of a truth value function. Object kinds to be considered are: common sense objects, technical objects, humanities object kinds (social, psychical, ...), objects of art, ... , be they abstract, concrete, or in this respect mixed objects. Then have a comment on the just referenced label abstract objects. Next try to get an idea wrt the ontological significance of the fact, that pure math objects and functions in some important classical cases can be uniquely defined by means of categorical theories. Here, in the course of my argument, I have a little corollary wrt the standard model of first order Peano arithmetic, reducing the epistemological significance of the existence of the non standard models. Next, wrt a special concept of a formalized empirical theory, I care for whether the impure math objects and mixed objects described here, and complying best with truth value function mapping, are also reliable candidates for the ontological commitment of such theories; and discuss an alternative, which reduces the ontological significance of the universe of discourse of the theories intended models. -finis