Application of the Sirius Code to Oklahoma Cash 5: An Empirical Analysis of the Victoria-Nash Asymmetric Equilibrium and Sustainable Profitability

06 June 2025, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed by Cambridge University Press at the time of posting.

Abstract

This empirical study applies the Sirius Code to the Oklahoma Cash 5 lottery, leveraging the Victoria-Nash Asymmetric Equilibrium (VNAE) to construct a fixed subset strategy using partial coverage with concentrated density. Over 100 consecutive real-world draws, a total of 792 tickets per draw (with m = 12) yielded a net profit of $68,150, or $6,815 per draw on average. Even with reduced subsets (e.g. m = 10; 252 tickets; net profit of $35,400 or $354 per draw), the results remained proportionally profitable, in line with the linearity of expectation. The findings suggest that, under certain conditions such as taming some of the true randomness by transforming the “noise” and the “unpredictable” into a strategic game under the lens of game theory and probability theory, it is possible to obtain an asymmetric advantage and consequent sustainable profitability not only for syndicates, but also for individual players.

Keywords

randomnes
lotteries
statistics
game theory
behavioral economics
Victoria-Nash Asymmetric Equilibrium

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