Reform Alternatives to the Judicial Enforcement Procedure in the Light of "Equality of Arms" and the Harmonization of Fundamental Rights

In my study, I examine the historical and dogmatic foundations of the Hungarian judicial enforcement system, as well as the internal tensions of the current regulations, in light of creditor protection and the "equality of arms." Although the introduction of the independent judicial officer model following the regime change was essential for the effective management of the increased caseload and the demands of a market economy, the current rules on proportionality and debtor protection create an asymmetry, as they provide opportunities for bad-faith debtors to hide assets and delay the process. To resolve of this issue, I urge a procedural paradigm shift that would replace passive asset tracing by the judicial officer with an active obligation for the debtor to disclose their assets, which could also be sanctioned under criminal law. Through the domestic adaptation of German and Austrian legal models (ZPO, EO), my proposal would introduce a debtor's statement under oath. The refusal to provide this or the making of a false statement would entail criminal sanctions (such as confinement or the establishment of perjury). A key element of the outlined model would be the creation of a Register of Debtors functioning as an economic sanction, which would isolate non-cooperative debtors from financial services. In my study, I point out that the introduction of this radical creditor protection tool can only be reconciled with the Fundamental Law and the GDPR if data processing is based on public interest and operates with strict functional access restrictions and objective deletion deadlines.