A Bidirectional Two-Particle Model of Conscious Identity: A Falsifiable Framework for Subjective Continuity

Current theories explain how neural activity relates to conscious experience but do not specify why one first-person perspective remains associated with one physical system rather than another when multiple systems satisfy the same functional or computational criteria. This article treats subjective continuity as a distinct scientific question. I develop a theoretical framework that proposes two hypothetical components with separate functions: X-UQUPC, which is proposed to preserve numerical conscious identity, and X-UQGPC, which is proposed to mediate bidirectional interactions between mental states and neural activity. I examine whether this framework satisfies logical constraints arising from thought experiments involving brain reactivation, reconstruction, and replication, and I compare it with Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, Higher-Order Theory, predictive-processing accounts, functionalism, Orchestrated Objective Reduction, and Parfit's deflationary view of personal identity. I extend the analysis to non-human consciousness and gradual biological-to-synthetic neuronal replacement while treating both as open empirical questions rather than established conclusions. The framework generates explicit, falsifiable predictions and specifies conventional alternative explanations, experimental controls, and criteria for support and falsification. Several predictions are experimentally accessible with current or emerging neuroscience methods, whereas the central claim concerning numerical identity remains unobservable by construction. The value of the framework therefore depends not on the correctness of its assumptions but on whether its predictions withstand empirical testing.