Abstract
The advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally altered the security architecture of human civilization. While traditional security paradigms often frame nuclear arsenals as essential tools for deterrence and strategic stability, this paper evaluates nuclear weapons through the lenses of complex systems theory, human security, and normative long-termism. By integrating historical data on near-misses, ecological modeling of nuclear winter, and analyses of emerging technologies—specifically Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) and hypersonic glide vehicles—this study argues that the systemic risks of nuclear weapons far outweigh their theoretical deterrence value. Acknowledging the profound challenges of disarmament, this paper proposes a multifaceted global governance framework aimed at mitigating these existential risks through structured, verifiable abolition and supranational oversight.



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